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Abstract  —  Security risk assessment is considered a 
significant and indispensible process in all phases of software 
development lifecycles, and most importantly at the early 
phases. Estimating the security risk should be integrated 
with the other product developments parts and this will help 
developers and engineers determine the risky elements in the 
software system, and reduce the failure consequences in that 
software. This is done by building models based on the data 
collected at the early development cycles. These models will 
help identify the high security risk elements. In this paper, we 
introduce a new methodology used at the early phases based 
on the Unified Modeling Language (UML), Attack graph, 
and other factors. We estimate the probability and severity of 
security failure for each element in software architecture 
based on UML, attack graph, data sensitivity analysis, access 
rights, and reachability matrix. Then risk factors are 
computed. An e-commerce case study is investigated as an 
example. 
Index Terms  —  Attack Graph, Probability of security 
failure, Security risk factor, Severity of security failure, 
Software Architecture. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Risk assessment involves many activities including risk 
prioritization in which the risk exposed based on the 
probability of risk occurrence and its impact on software 
quality [11]. Performing it at the early phases of software 
development can enhance allocation of resources within 
the software lifecycle. Also, it provides useful means for 
identifying potentially troublesome software elements that 
need careful attention in development and throughout all 
phases of software lifecycles. We are concerned with 
security-based risk of software architecture. The risk can 
be defined with two parts, the probability and the severity. 
In our case, the security risk assessment consists of two 
parts, probability of security failure and the consequence 
of such a security failure.  
According to [3], software security can be defined as 
“the idea of engineering software so that it continues to 
function correctly under malicious attack. Most 
technologists acknowledge this undertaking’s importance, 
but they need some help in understanding how to tackle 
it.” Over the last many years, the security attacks on 
software have grown significantly. The attack can be 
defined as a means of exploiting a vulnerability, which is 
defined as an error or weakness in design, implementation, 
or operation [8] . Security incidents reported to the 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team Coordination 
Center (CERT/CC) rose 2,099 percent from 1998 through 
2002, an average annual compounded rate of 116 percent. 
Most of these incidents resulted from software 
vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities can impact critical 
infrastructure, as well as commerce and security [9]. 
Therefore, the importance of software security has been 
manifested by many researchers and practitioners. 
Furthermore it has been shown that the earlier we 
incorporate security in the software the better would be in 
term of effort and cost [4]. 
In this paper, we develop a new methodology to 
estimate the security risk assessment at the architectural 
level based on UML, Attack Graph, data significance, 
access rights and other factors. First we estimate the 
probabilities of security failure for each elements in each 
scenario by building the attack graph. Second we estimate 
the severity of security failures for each element based on 
UML and multiple factors (element classification, data 
significance, reachability matrix, and access rights). An e-
commerce case study will be conducted in our analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly 
discuss the related work in Section II. In Section III, we 
introduce our methodologies to estimate the security risk 
factors. At the end, we conclude with a discussion of 
future work in Section IV.  
II. RELATED WORK 
This research is different from previous work on 
security assessment in many important aspects. First 
aspect, our methodology is based on UML modeling of 
the software at the architectural level. Prior work was 
based on the production and code level, and their 
assessment was conducted after the system was tested and 
in production. No mathematical models and probabilistic 
arguments were used [7]. Our approach adopts the 
software systems at architectural level. Additionally our 
approach uses mathematical model to estimate the two 
parts of risk factors, probabilities and severities. Second 
aspect, the attack graph was built based on the attacker 
knowledge of system protocols and method of 
implementations, and the analysis was conducted on 
network and in production system. The risk analysis was 
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defined based on only probabilities without estimating the 
severity work [2].  In contrast, our methodology estimates 
probabilities and severity for all components and 
connectors without the need to know the protocols used.  
Third aspect, much previous work on threat modeling was 
based on the attacker capabilities in exploiting 
vulnerabilities and counting all these vulnerabilities 
quantitatively without really estimating the probabilities 
and severities of attacks [6] [1] [5]. In our work, we take 
the security risk assessment measurement based on system 
knowledge and not based on the attacker power and 
behavior and ability to attack the software system.  
In Summary, this paper is the first to mathematically 
and systematically estimate the security risk assessment of 
software system at the architectural level. Our approach is 
proactive, where previous works were reactive. 
III. SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we introduce our security risk 
assessment methodology by explaining each step of the 
algorithm. The proposed methodology is based on uses 
cases and scenarios. In a given use case and given 
scenario, we estimate the probability and severity of 
security failures for each element in the system. We will 
use the UML sequence diagram as the first reference 
where it shows the messages exchanged between the 
components and the time lines of the execution. Fig. 1 
shows the proposed algorithm. 
We present an ecommerce application to illustrate the 
steps of our methodology. We choose a typical scenario 
that allows customers, attackers, or administrators to 
communicate with the system. In such an application, 
security attacks could easily happen with significant 
damages such as loss of customer data records. Fig. 2 
shows the Sequence Diagram for a buy a book scenario. In 
the following subsection A, we present the methodology 
of estimating the probability of security failure. Then in 
subsection B, we present the methodology of estimating 
the severity of security failure. In subsection C, we 
estimate components risk factors.  
 
A. Probability of Security Failure 
In this section, we describe the process of estimating the 
probability of security failure for each element based on 
the UML sequence diagrams and attack graphs. We 
describe the methodology of developing the attack graph 
for each component from a given UML sequence diagram. 
Then we use probabilistic arguments to estimate the 
probability of security failure for that component. 
We first define the attack graphs as follows. The Attack 
Graph [2] can be represented as a Tuple 
                                                                 (1) 
    is a set of initial nodes. The initial nodes are the initial 
contact points where the attacker initiates the attack. They 
are on the side of the actors.     is a set of exploit nodes. 
They represent the messages between the system and the 
components or messages between the components. The 
attacker exploits these messages in order to reach to other 
elements in the system.     is a set of intermediate 
condition nodes. The Intermediate condition nodes are the 
components of the system where that attacker uses to 
reach to the goal component.     is the goal node. It 
represents the goal component.    is a set of edges 
between nodes (conditions and exploits).  Fig. 4 shows the 
attack graph for the customer agent component.  
   {           }    {     }  
  {                                 } 
 Eprob( ) denotes the exploit success probability of   . It 
is the probability of exploiting the message  .   Cprob( ) 
denotes the condition obtained probability of component 
 . It represents the probability of reaching component  .  
Oprob( ) denotes the successful occurrence probability of 
exploit  . It represents the probability of successful 
occurrence of message   coming from components c1, 
c2,…,ck  
                                           (2) 
            ∑                                     (3) 
Where c is an intermediate component or goal component.  
Where          are the messages reaching component c. 
The following steps describe the proposed methodology to 
develop the attack graph based on UML sequence 
diagram: 
1- Choose a component as a goal node. We will 
pick the customer agent in Fig. 2 as a goal node.  
2- Extract the initial set   from the UML sequence 
diagram. In Fig. 2    {           }  where 
m=8 represents the number of the total direct 
messages exchanged between the system and 
outside world. We assume there is an attack on 
the system through one of these initial nodes. We 
assume all initial nodes have equally likely 
distribution,   
                                           (4) 
 VI [13] denotes the Vulnerability Index. (VI) is 
defined as the number of successful attacks on  
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 For each use case 
 For each scenario 
 Identify components, connectors, schedules from UML sequence diagram 
 For each component 
 Identify the messages, data, connectors related to that component 
 Build the attack graph 
 Estimate the probability of security failure from attack graph 
 Estimate severity of security failure based on component classification, Access 
rights, and Reachability Matrix 
 Calculate risk factor 
 Sort the list of components risk factors  
 
 
Fig. 1. The security risk analysis algorithm. 
 
customer interface Customer agent (g) <<database>>customer
information
<<database>>orders server <<actor>>Financial Institutedelivery agent<<actor>> customer
Access main page()  1.1
main page()  1.2
login(user name+ password)  2.1
send(user name+ password) 2.2
userinformationquery(username+password)  2.3
verified() 2.4
loginconfirm() 2.5
loginconfirm() 2.6
buy(book,creditcard)  3.1
buy(book,creditcard)  3.2
<<database>> books server
search(book) 3.3
bookavailable()  3.4 reservefunds(creditcard,customerinformation) 3.5
fundreserved() 3.8
buyrequest(ordernumber, address, book)  4.1
writeorderdata(ordernumber, address, books)  5.1
orderstatus() 3.10
orderstatus() 3.11
generateordernumber() 3.9
Ecommerce system External system
External 
system
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
t6
t7
t8
tia1
tia3
Cci1
Ecommerce system
 
Fig. 2.  Sequence diagram of the buy book scenario. 
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              the system to the total number of attacks. The  
              value of VI is determined by domain experts.       
3- Extract a partial set   of exploit nodes set T 
(      ).    {           }   
 represents the 
direct messages exchanged between the external 
actors and the system. If we assume all these 
external messages have equally likely 
distribution,  
                                (5) 
Messages {Accessmainpage(),  Mainpage(), 
login(username,password), loginconfirm(), 
buy(book,creditcard), orderstatus(), 
reservefund(), fundreserved()} are the exploit 
nodes in the set   .  
4- Extract a partial set of the intermediate condition 
nodes. These represent the components in our 
system connected to the external actors through 
set   . In Fig. 2, the customer interface 
component is an intermediate condition node. In 
Fig. 4,     denotes the customer interface 
component node.    
5- Extract a partial set of exploit nodes set that 
represents the internal messages produced by 
components in step 4. In Fig. 2, The internal 
messages send(username, password) and 
buy(book, creditcard) are the messages produced 
by the component customer interface node. In 
Fig. 4, these two messages are (         ) to the 
customer agent goal node.  
6- Repeat step 5 and 6 above until we include all 
internal messages and internal components that 
lead to the goal node. 
7- From UML sequence diagram, we extract the 
schedules [10]. A schedule is defined as a 
sequence of messages executed to do a certain 
process. These schedules will help count the 
effect of one message on a component only once. 
In the ecommerce application, we define five 
schedules. 
Schedule1:Accessmainpage(){1.1},mainpage(){1
.2}. Schedule 2, 3, 4, and 5 can easily be obtained 
from the UML sequence diagram in Fig. 2.   
After developing the attack graph for each component, 
we use the equations (2&3) to estimate the probability of 
security failure of the goal node.  
                                      
 
 
  
The exploits nodes (         ) represent the messages 
send(username, password) and buy(book, creditcard) 
going between the components customer interface and 
customer agent. These two messages will carry over any 
attack coming from outside.             and 
            are estimated:  
                                                         (6) 
Where Z is the total number of messages exchanged 
between the two components. Matrix MA shows the 
numbers of exchanged messages between every two 
components i, j in our system. In Fig. 2, we have 6 
components, the following MA (6*6) shows messages 
exchanged in this example. 
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Cprob(g) is the estimated probability of security failure 
for customer agent component. Similarly, we can estimate 
the probabilities of security failures for the other 
components. Table 1 shows the probabilities of security 
failures for each component in this specific scenario.   
B. Severity of Security Failure 
In this section, we consider the severity of consequences 
of security failure. Our approach takes into the account the 
severity related to each component in the software 
architecture. Our approach depends on how the security 
failure for each element is impacting the system. Severity 
of security failure for certain element should consider the 
worst case consequence of such failures. Pfleeger [12] 
discusses the three common categories of impact that 
could affect elements’ confidentiality, Integrity and 
availability. From the three categories, we come up with 
two classifications of architectural components. One is a 
database component category, and the second is non-
database component category. The non-database 
components can be classified into two types, one has a 
direct connection with a database component and offer 
services to it and consequently has the same level of 
severity of that database component. The second type does 
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not connect directly to a database component and we 
check the reachability.  We identify five severity levels.  
 Catastrophic: A security failure could cause 
security breach to the whole system and whole 
database (all records). 
 Critical: A security failure could cause security 
breach to the whole system (one record) or two 
database components (all records). 
 Major: A security failure could cause security 
breach to one database component (all records) or 
two database components (one record).  
 Minor: A security failure may cause security 
breach to one database component (one record) 
or security breach to non-database component 
with high reachability.  
 Low: A security failure may cause security 
breach to non-database component with low 
reachability. 
Values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are assigned to low, minor, 
major, critical, and catastrophic levels respectively. Fig. 3 
describes the steps to estimate the impact on the system 
when security failures occur: In our case study, we 
estimate the severity of customer information database 
component. Since this is a database component, we check 
the data sensitivity. This database stores the customer 
username and password for customers. Any security 
breach on this database will lead to security breach to the 
whole system, therefore the sensitivity is high and severity 
is Catastrophic (Access right is admin). According to the 
algorithm, we assign value of 5 to the customer 
information database component severity. Similarly, 
customer agent is non-base component; however it has 
connection with a customer information database. 
Therefore it has the same severity level. After normalizing 
the severity, the severities for customer information 
database and customer agent components become (1). 
C. Security Risk Factors 
In this section, we calculate the risk factor for each 
component in a given scenario based on the probability of 
security failure and severity of security failure using the 
following equation: 
rf(c)=Prob(c)*Severity(c)             (7) 
Where Prob(c) {           }is the probability of 
security failure of a component in a scenario, and severity 
(c)  {                 } is the severity level of a 
component in the same scenario. After calculating the risk 
factors for each component in a given scenario, we form 
the scenario list risk factors and sort them. This process is 
repeated for each scenario in a given use case. However 
due to the limited space in this paper, we will not discuss 
the calculations of risk factors for the scenarios, uses 
cases, and the whole system. Table 1 shows the 
probabilities, severities, and risk factors of all components 
in buy a book scenario.  
 
Component Probability Severity Risk Factor 
Customer 
Interface 
VI(6.5/8) .4 .325VI 
Customer 
Agent 
VI(5/8) 1 .625VI 
Customer 
information 
database 
VI(3/16) 1 .18VI 
Books 
database 
VI(3/16) .4 .07VI 
Delivery 
agent 
VI(5/8) .4 .25VI 
Orders 
database 
VI(5/8) .4 .25VI 
 
Table. 1. Probabilities, severities, and risk factors of all 
components in buy book scenario. 
For each component 
 If the component is a database element 
o Check data sensitivity 
 Assign severity based on data sensitivity (Critical =high sensitive, Major=  medium sensitive, 
Minor=  low sensitive) 
 Else // component is not a database element 
o if the component has a direct connection with a database component 
 Assign database component severity to the non-database component 
o Else// no direct connection with database 
 Assign severity based on reachability (Minor= high reachable, Low = low reachable) 
 Check Access rights of the component 
 If (Access rights == admin) 
 Increase severity level by one level 
 Normalize the component’s severity 
 
Fig. 3. The security severity analysis algorithm. 
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Fig. 4. Attack graph of customer agent component. 
IV.CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a methodology for 
security risk assessment based on UML specifications, 
Attack Graph development, database sensitivity, 
reachability Matrix, and access rights. Furthermore, our 
estimation is performed at the early phases of software 
lifecycle. Thus, early security attacks detection will help 
developers focus on high security risk elements, scenarios 
and use cases. Our assessment is not only beneficial to 
developers, but also to software companies, industries, 
governments, and consumers especially most systems are 
built to be used through internet. 
Our work can be extended in more than one direction. 
First, an important extension is to automate the security 
risk assessment of any system .Second, extend our 
methodology to assess the security risk in the clouds and 
hosting systems especially the future is growing 
significantly in these two directions. 
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